THE STATUS OF ANTI-COMMUNIST LEGISLATION
THE presence of an internal Communist movement bent on forcibly

overthrowing the Government 1 has necessitated periodic enactment
of federal statutes limiting the freedom of activity of Communists
in the United States. 2 On several occasions the Supreme Court has
construed these statutes narrowly for purposes of reconciliation with
rights and privileges of the first and fifth amendments. 3 This
comment will examine the effect of such decisions upon the legislative attempt to minimize the Communist threat of forcible overthrow.
COMMUNIST ADVOCACY

Advocacy4 is a form of speech generally protected by the first
amendment.5 Like obscene and libelous utterances,6 however, advocacy attaining a significant nexus with action injurious to the
public welfare is not immunized from proscription and punish' The Communist threat has been detailed by Congress in the Subversive Activities
Control Act (McCarran Act) § 2, 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1958).
The Communist control system is primarily grounded upon the following acts:
Alien Registration Act of 1940 (Smith Act) §§ 2, 3, 5, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385
(Supp. V, 1964) (outlawing advocacy of forcible governmental overthrow and criminally
proscribing membership in any society which so advocates); Subversive Activities Control Act (McCarran Act) §§ 1-17, 21, 64 Stat. 987 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 78198 (1958, Supp. V, 1964) (requiring, inter alia, registration of Communist organizations
and individual disclosure of Party membership upon applying for employment with
the United States); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 504, 73 Stat.
536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. V, 1964) (prohibiting the holding of union office
by any member of the Communist Party during his membership or for five years after
termination of such membership).
a "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble...." U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...."
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
'"Advocacy is defined in the Century Dictionary as: '1. The act of pleading for,
supporting, or recommending; active espousal."
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
665 (1925). "Advocacy constitutes action and the instigation of action, not mere belief
or opinion." First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 434,
311 P.2d 508, 517 (1957). But see Butash v. State, 212 Ind. 492, 497, 9 N.E.2d 88, 90
(1937).
See note 3 supra.
'E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250. 255-57 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
"[T]he lewd and obscene. the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words ... by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace." Ibid.
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ment. The test for determining a causal relationship between
advocacy and injurious action was crystallized by Mr. Justice Holmes
who, speaking for the Supreme Court in 1919, formulated the "clear
and present danger" test." Under this formula, speech may not be
9 (2) it is
proscribed unless (1) the harm it threatens is substantial;
probable that the threatened harm will materialize;10 and (3) materialization of the harm is imminent.." The relative emphasis accorded these factors in first amendment litigation, however, has
varied since 1919.12
Subsequently, in the Smith Act of 194013 Congress imposed criminal penalties 14 upon those advocating "the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the
United States... by force or violence,"' 1 and upon those organizing
7 "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.... The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)
(Holmes, J.).
8Id. at 47-53.
9 See Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 501-03 (1949); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348-50 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945);
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-42 (1943); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 510 U.S. 88, 102-06 (1940); Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
10 See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 308-11 (1940 ; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374-76 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 272 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
"See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 105-06 (1940); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 574-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12 Immediately after Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), the clear and
present danger test was relegated by the Court to apply only in cases where the
legislature had not determined that a specified class of utterances creates the danger
of a substantive evil. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371-72 (1927);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668-70 (1925). In a series of cases immediately prior
to World War II, however, the test was applied by the Court to all first amendment
cases. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310-11 (1940) (publicly expressing
religious views); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (antipicketing statute).
Since that time, the test has been applied by the Court, but its content remains somewhat uncertain. See generally Hur'ON, FREEDoM OF SPEECH AND Paas IN AmaERA 69-166
(1963).
"I Alien Registration Act of 1940, §§ 2, 3, 5, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2585 (Supp. V,

1964).
"4The original maximum penalty of a $10,000 fine or ten years imprisonment, or
both, provided in § 5 (b), was raised to $20,000 and twenty years respectively by Act of

July 24, 1956, § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. V, 1964).
25

Alien Registration Act of 1940, § 2 (a) (1), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp, V. 1964).
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or attempting to organize any society of persons which would so
advocate. " The act was aimed directly at attempts to form the
Communist Party,'7 and in 1949 eleven Party leaders were convicted
for conspiring to organize the Party in New York. I s On appeal,
the Supreme Court held in Dennis v. United States 9 that in order
to sustain the convictions it was necessary first to determine that
the defendants specifically intended to accomplish overthrow, and
then to apply the clear and present danger test to the facts of the
case. 20 Having found the requisite specific intent, 21 the Court
altered the independent standards of Holmes' clear and present
danger test by holding that advocacy could be proscribed if the
22
harm threatened by such advocacy was significantly substantial..
Under Dennis, the elements of probability and imminence were
relegated to a secondary status, apparently affecting the outcome of
a case only in situations where the threatened harm was relatively
insubstantial.
However, in 1957 on virtually identical facts, the Supreme Court
reversed the convictions of Party leaders in California. In Yates v.
United States,23 the Court revamped the Dennis rule to include the
element of probability as a requisite factor in Smith Act prosecutions. It held that the Government had failed to prove that the
defendants would have advocated forcible overthrow to a group of
"sufficient size and cohesiveness" to justify a reasonable expectation
of action inimical to the public interest. 24 Significantly, since Yates
the Government has ceased to prosecute under the advocacy clause.25
Under Dennis any attempt to overthrow the Government by
force, no matter how futile, constitutes substantial harm for purposes
Alien Registration Act of 1940, § 2 (a) (3), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. V, 1964).
17 See, e.g., 86 CoNG. REC. 9032-33 (1940) (remarks of Congressmen Hobbs and
Ramspeck).
16 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1950).
"341 U.S. 494 (1951).
20 Id. at 508-10.
21 The Court noted that mere study and "discussion" of Communist theory would
be constitutionally protected speech which was not proscribed by the Smith Act. Id.
at 502.
22 Id. at 509.
This analysis, according to the Court, also vitiates any distinction
between a mere conspiracy to advocate and advocacy itself, since the existence of the
tonspirac) alone creates a subtantial danger. Id. at 511.
.. 354 U S. 298 tl957).
*lId at 321-22.
"t See Fujimoto v. United States, 251 F.2d 342 (9th Cir 1958), United States v, Yates.
158 F SLupp 480 481 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
10

372
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test. 28

The evidence necessary to
of the clear and present danger
demonstrate a probable materialization of that harm is less certain.
Five of the fourteen defendants in Yates were granted directed
acquittals on the ground that mere teaching of Party doctrine does
27 Hownot create a probable materialization of violent overthrow.
ever, directed acquittals were denied for the remaining nine defendants because they were implicated in teaching specific acts of
28
violence.
Assuming probability of harm is found to exist, Justice Holmes'
original formulation of the clear and present danger test would
require that the Government also prove that materialization of that
harm was imminent. 29 The majority opinion in Yates clearly intimated that imminence is not a factor: "the Government need not
hold its hand 'until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans
have been laid and the signal awaited.' "30 However, at least two
members of the present Court have continually asserted that abridgment of speech is unconstitutional when sufficient time remains to
avert the advocated evil by means other than prohibition of the
advocacy.8 1 This minority view stresses the value of an open forum
where advocacy need not be suppressed unless it presents a threat of
injury so imminent that there is no time for words of reason to
counter the threat.3 2 Nevertheless, it is arguable that the imminence
factor has no realistic place in Smith Act prosecutions, for legislative
and judicial investigations have indicated that Communist indoctrination consists of a rigid training program in which the inductee
2 841 U.S. at 509.
' 354 U.S. at 329-31.
2

8Id. at 31-3. Compare Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1961).
,' In Dennis the Court sustained the trial court's charge that action need only be
planned "as speedily as circumstances would permit." 341 U.S. at 510. Yates also
accepted this view. 354 U.S. at 321. This is the antithesis of the imminency test,
which requires proximity in time linking the words to the advocated action. See
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
0 354 U.S. at 821.
"2 See, e.g., id.at 340 (Black, J., concurring); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. at 585
(Douglas, J., disenting).
32 See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN TIM UNITED STATES 33-85 (1941).

"If there be any

among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form,
let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion
may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." Thomas Jefferson, First

Inauguration Address, March 4, 1801, in 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 819 (Bergh
ed. 1907). Compare Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,

dissenting).
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is deprived of the value of an open forum because he is disciplined
to accept orders without question. 33
MEMBERSHIP IN COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS

Active Membership

In addition to prohibiting advocacy of and conspiracy to advocate
forcible overthrow, the Smith Act also declares illegal membership

in a society of persons who so advocate.3 4 In Scales v. United States,35
a defendant indicted under the membership clause contended that
imputation of guilt solely on the basis of his Party membership was
inconsistent with the due process clause of the fifth amendment and,
furthermore, that the Smith Act membership clause contravened his

right to freedom of association under the first amendment. 36
The Court construed the membership clause as it had the ad-

vocacy clause, that is, to require as an element of the crime that the
defendant specifically intended to accomplish violent overthrow of
the Government.37 Furthermore, the Court refused to attribute

to Congress the purpose of visiting upon non-active Party members
the heavy penalties imposed by the Smith Act; 3s hence the statutory

3
term "member" was construed to reach only active members 0

whose participation in the illegal advocacy of the Party was sufficient

to satisfy established due process standards of criminal imputabil40
ity.
As a result of this construction, those members who participate
38 See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 244-51 (1961); Communist Control
Act § 2, 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1958).
Alien Registration Act of 1940, § 2 (a) (3), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. V, 1964).
367 U.S. 203 (1961).
"Id. at 220.

Id. at 221-22. See notes 20-21 supra.
3s The Court justified this addition to the statutory classification by asserting that
Congress only intended to eradicate the threat of violent overthrow. Thus, the act
does not punish membership for the purpose of nonviolent revolution. 367 U.S. at
221-22, 252 n.27. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. at 499-500; cf. Subversive
Activities Control Act § 4(a), 64 Stat. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783 (a) (1958), which
punishes a conspiracy to perform any act which would substantially contribute to the
establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship in the United States, "Provided, however,
That this subsection shall not apply to the proposal of a constitutional amendment."
"1The Court stated that the term "active" was not so vague as to afford defendants
inadequate notice of criminal conduct because "the distinction between 'active' and
'nominal' membership is well understood in common parlance." 367 U.S. at 223.
10Id. at 222, 224-28. The Court noted that the longstanding concept of punishment for conspirac) and complicity is grounded on the principle that "society, having
the power to punish dangerous behavior, cannot be powerless against those who work
to bring about that behavior." Id at 224-25.
37
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solely to advance legitimate aims were exempted from criminal
sanction. 41 Since Dennis and Yates had established that advocacy
prohibited by the Smith Act was not constitutionally protected
speech, the Court felt that it was logical to preclude active membership in a society which so advocated from constitutional protection. 42
The membership clause, thus limited to exclude legitimate political
association, was held consistent with the first amendment's guarantee
43
of freedom of association.
In order to sustain Scales' conviction in light of the due process
clause, it was necessary to find that a significant portion of the Party's
activity during Scales' membership constituted illegal advocacy under the Yates rule. The evidence had established that one member
of Scale's group instructed indoctrinees in the art of provoking riots
by killing with a pencil; 44 consequently, that illegal advocacy was
imputable to other active members including Scales 45 In the companion case of Noto v. United States4 6 however, the Court held that
the defendant can be convicted only on evidence concerning that
segment of the Party of which he was allegedly a member, and not
upon evidence pertaining to other segments of the Party or upon
what may be supposed to be the tenets and activity of the Party as a
47
whole.
A comparison of the standards enunciated in Yates and Scales
reveals an apparent dichotomy in the application of first amendment
protection. Under the former, advocacy of forcible overthrow must
entail a significant degree of probability of action detrimental to the
public welfare to be illegal. 48 Probability of harm resulting from
the proscribed fact of membership in the Party, on the other hand, is
not required by the Scales rule. 49 Perhaps such probability can be
1

2 Id. at 229-30.

,"in this instance it is an organization which engages in criminal activity, and we
can perceive no reason why one who actively and knowingly works in the ranks of
that organization, intending to contribute to the success of those specifically illegal
activities, should be any more immune from prosecution than he to whom the
organization has assigned the task of carrying out the substantive criminal act." Id.
at 226-27.
4
8Id.
at 228-29.
"Id. at 249-51; see text accompanying note 28 supra.
5
1d.
I at 251.
,367 U.S. 290 (1961).
"7Id. at 299.
"See text accompanying note 24 supra.
,, See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
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presumed to exist by imputing illegal advocacy, in the form of
encouragement and assistance to others, to any active members. 50
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that an active member may be unaware
of the illegal activities of others associated with his Party, and it is
submitted that a probability of harm resulting from active membership alone cannot be demonstrated in the absence of actual knowledge of illegal advocacy.
Registrationof the Party
The 1950 McCarran Act 5' signified a fresh approach to the
problem of Communism in the United States. The act was aimed at
exposing instead of punishing the activities and membership of the
Communist Party;5 2 hence, it provided in part for mandatory
registration with the Attorney General of all "Communist-action
organizations" and all "Communist-front organizations."53 The act
defined a "Communist-action organization" as one which is substantially controlled by the foreign government controlling the
world Communist movement,5 4 and which "operates primarily to
advance the objectives of such world Communist movement."5 5 The
"Communist-front organization" was defined as one controlled by a
Communist-action group and operated for the purpose of giving aid
to the latter, but not engaging directly in the advancement of illegal
Communist objectives.5 6
50 See note 42 supra.

51 Subversive Activities Control Act (McCarran Act) §§ 1-17, 21, 64 Stat. 987 (1950),
as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1958, Supp. V, 1964).
5 See Subversive Activities Control Act § 2 (6), (7), (15), 64 Stat. 988-89 (1950), 50
U.S.C. § 781 (6), (7), (15) (1958). There are indications that the McCarran Act was
directed at accomplishing the same result as the Smith Act (protection of the government from internal attack) without employing criminal sanctions which had the
adverse effects of driving the Party further underground and of creating martyrs out
of radicals. See Hearings on H.R. 4422 and H.R. 4581 Before the Subcommittee on
Legislation of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 22
(1948) (Clark, J., then Attorney General); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. at 279
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Subversive Activities Control Act § 7, 64 Stat. 998 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1958).
" "The direction and control of the world Communist movement is vested in and
exercised by the Communist dictatorship of a foreign country." Subversive Activities
Control Act § 2 (41. 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (4) (1958). The McCarran Act
never explicitly states which foreign country controls the world Communist movement.
" Subversive Activities Control Act § 8(3) (a), 64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §
782 (8) (a) (1958)
5"Subversive Activities Control Act § 3 (4), 64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (4)
,1958).
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A. Communist-action Organizations
The McCarran Act, as implemented by regulations promulgated
by the Justice Department, 57 requires an officer or a duly authorized
agent of any action organization to register the organization with
the Department of Justice.5 This subscribed registration form must
be accompanied by a complete list of the organization's present
officers and rank-and-file members. 9 To avoid the contention that
this procedure violates the self-incrimination clause of the fifth
amendment, Congress provided in section 4 (f) of the McCarran Act
that "neither the holding of office nor membership in any Communist organization by any person shall constitute per se a violation of
6 0 However, when
[this act] ... or of any other criminal statute."1
Scales interposed section 4 (f)
as a defense to criminal liability under
the Smith Act, the section was construed to protect only "mere membership," as opposed to active membership with specific intent pro61
scribed by the Smith Act.
17Subversive Activities Control Act § 7, 64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1958);
28 C.F.R. § 11.200 (1964).
"5Ibid.;see Communist Party v. United States, 331 F.2d 807, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 968 (1964). Since certified authorization by the organization
would necessarily require the signature of one or more officers of the organization, the
regulation amounts to a requirement that an officer sign on behalf of the organization.
69 Subversive Activities Control Act § 7 (d), 64 Stat. 994 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786 (d)
(198).
"Subversive Activities Control Act § 4(f), 64 Stat. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783(t)
(1958). Congressman Celler explained the rule of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892), to the effect that if the required disclosure of membership could lead to
the uncovering of other evidence that could be used to convict the registrant under a
federal statute, the registration provisions would be vitiated by the fifth amendment.
Hence, Celler stated that a grant of complete immunity is necessary in the McCarran
Act. 96 CONG. REc. 13740 (1950). Subsequently, the provision that the fact of
registration should not be received in evidence against any registrant was changed in
conference committee to the present form of § 4 (f). See Scales v. United States, 867
U.S. at 282-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This history may indicate that § 4(f) was
meant to extend immunity to Party members from membership clause convictions as
long as the forced registration requirements of § 7 remained in effect. See id. at 285-86.
Sections 4 (b) and 4 (c) of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat. 991 (1950),
50 U.S.C. § 783 (b), (c) (1958), prohibit the communication of classified information to
a member of any Communist organization; § 5 (a), 64 Stat. 992, 50 U.S.C. § 784 (a),
makes it a crime for a member of a Communist organization to apply for or accept
employment with the United States without disclosing the fact of such membership;
§ 6(a), 64 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 785, prohibits a member of any Communist organization
from seeking a passport from the State Department. Hence, the meaning of the words
"per se" in section 4(f) appears to be that evidence of membership in a Communist
organization will be admissible only when accompanied by evidence showing a violation
of some criminal statute which proscribes specific activity that would be legal if done
by anyone other than a member of a Communist organization. See Scales v. United
States, supra at 280 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1"367 U.S. at 209.
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Shortly after passage of the McCarran Act the Justice Department requested the Communist Party to register as a Communistaction organization.6 2 The Party refused, and after eleven years of
litigation and hearings, 63 the Supreme Court ruled in Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd. 64 that the Party was an
action organization required to register with the Attorney General.
The organization's contention that section 7 of the McCarran Act
contravenes the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment
was declared prematurely raised, since the Court could not know
whether the Party's officers would ever claim that privilege. 65 Upon
subsequent refusal of the Party's officers to register, it was held in
Communist Party v. United States66 that registration could not be
compelled unless the Justice Department produced a volunteer who
was willing to waive his privilege against self-incrimination. 7 Thus,
the limitation of immunity under section 4 (f) to "mere membership" has resulted in subordinating the McCarran Act policy of
registration and disclosure to the Smith Act policy of proscription
and punishment.
Voluntary registration by an officer is unlikely as it would invite
conviction as an active member under the membership clause of
the Smith Act.68 Moreover, the Government probably could not
avoid the stumbling block of self-incrimination merely by alleging
that an officer of the Party lacked the specific intent required to
sustain conviction under the Smith Act.6 9 Self-incrimination problems clearly could be avoided, however, if the Government were to
grant the witness immunity from future Smith Act prosecutions
pursuant to the Immunity Act of 1954.70
Once the problem of self-incrimination is eliminated, Party
officers will be liable under section 7 (h) of the McCarran Act 7 ' for
62 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 867 U.S. 1, 19 (1961).

83 Id. at 19-22.
6, 867 U.S. 1 (1961).

6Id. at 106-08.
" 381 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 968 (1964).
'Id. at 814-15.
"See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra. It is reasonable to presume that

officers are active members.
01 Such an allegation would not by itself establish the lack of specific intent.
If the
matter were pursued, the defendant-officer could invoke his privilege against self-

incrimination on the issue of his intent.
TO18 U.S.C. § 8486(c) (1958).

(1956).

11 Subversive

Compare Ullmann v. United States, 550 U.S. 422

Activities Control Act § 7 (h). 64 Stat. 995 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786 (h)
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failure to register. And were the Party registered, attempts to vacate
this registration would succeed only if the Party was completely
disbanded.72
B: Communist-front Organizations
In American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,78 the court of appeals was presented
with first and fifth amendment questions related to compulsory
registration of Communist-front organizations 74 under section 7 of
the McCarran Act 75 In American Committee the defendant organization had provided legal services for aliens for over thirty
years.78 The Subversive Activities Control Board found that the
Committee's purposes were to win the good will and support of
aliens for the Communist Party and to contest the deportation of
Party members.7 7 In addition, the Board found the Committee to be
78
controlled by two rank-and-file members of the Communist Party.
These elements of control by and support of an action organization
authorized the Board to order the Committee to register as a front
organization.7 9
(1958). Section 7 (h) provides that in case of failure of a Communist organization to
register, responsibility for registering the organization devolves onto its executive
officer and its secretary, who then can be held personally liable for failure to register
the organization.
2 In cases involving registration of Communist-front organizations, one court of
appeals has held that registration cannot be compelled if the organization has been
totally dissolved. Labor Youth League v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 822
F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Washington Pension Union v. Subversive Activities Control
Rd., 322 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1963). In the Labor Youth League case, the court noted
that if the society was reorganized, the previous order to register would still be valid.
But in the Pension Union case, the front group had employed the legal form of a
corporation, and the court held that dissolution of the corporation permanently
vacated the order to register.
7 331 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1964), remanded per curiam, 85 S. Ct. 1148 (1965).
"American Committee brought before the Court the issues whether the McCarran
Act requirement for registration of front organizations is constitutional and whether
the defendant is a front organization within the purview of that Act. 33 U.S.L. WaEK
3013 (1964). The Court, however, remanded the case because of a stale record. 85
S. Ct. 1148 (1965).
" Subversive Activities Control Act § 7 (d) (2), 64 Stat. 994 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §
786 (d) (2) (1958).
7 331 F.2d at 54.
77 Ibid.
78 Id. at 55-57. It was not claimed, nor did the Board find, that these two officers of
the American Committee were active in the Communist Party. Such a finding would
have been unnecessary, since the statutory criterion of control by a Communist-action
organization is met if the director of the front group is merely a representative of the
action group. Id. at 56.
t Id. at 54.

Vol. 1965: 369]

ANTI-COMMUNIST LEGISLATION

The first amendment problem in American Committee falls
between those which occasioned two previous Supreme Court
decisions. In NAACP v. Alabama 0 the Court invalidated a similar
registration requirement imposed by Alabama on the NAACP on
the ground that the indirect abridgment of free association, due to
the attachment of public opprobrium to the members thus exposed,
was not justified by Alabama's interest in controlling intrastate
business of foreign corporations.8 ' In the first Communist Party
case, 82 on the other hand, the Court held that the interest of the
federal government in exposing members of a foreign-directed conspiracy to overthrow the Government was sufficient to justify compelled disclosure of membership lists, despite a comparable degree
of public opprobrium.8 3 A front organization such as the American
Committee does not by definition maintain a purpose of violent
overthrow. 4 However, it does solicit support from an unwary
public like the Communist Party, 85 and section 7 only requires disclosure of its officers, and not of its rank-and-file members. 6 Therefore, if the control by an action organization is found to result in
the front group's supporting that action group to a significant extent,
the first Communist Party case dictates that forced registration is
consistent with the first amendment. If it is shown that the front
group does not supply a significant degree of support to some action
organization, NAACP v. Alabama stands as authority for disallowing
forced registration.
Arguably, no fifth amendment problems are presented by forced
registration of front organizations,8 7 for membership in front groups
is not proscribed by the Smith Act. Nevertheless, a front organization by definition must be controlled by an action organization and
thus it is logical to infer that an officer of a front group is likely to
8 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
81

Id. at 462-66.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
88 ld. at 102-03.
84Otherwise, it would be classified as an action organization. See Subversive
Activities Control Act § 3 ()- (4), 64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (3)- (4) (1958).
88 See Subversive Activities Control Act § 2 (7), 64 Stat. 988 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §
781 (7) (1958); 367 U.S. at 103.
16 Subversive Activities Control Act § 7 (d), 64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786 (d)
(1958).
67 See discussion of the second Communist Party case, at text accompanying notes
66-68 supra.
82
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be an active member of some action organization.88 This inference
might subject the registration requirements 9 for front organizations
to the same self-incrimination impasse met by the Government in the
second Communist Party case.
TRAVEL

Section 6 of the McCarran Act 90 was designed to impede communication between Communist organizations in the United States
and the world Communist movement 91 by prohibiting the issuance
of passports to any member of a group subject to a final order to
register as a Communist-action or Communist-front organization.
After the first Communist Party decision, 92 the Subversive Activities
Control Board entered a final order directing the Party to register
as an action organization.9 3 Members of the Party were thus prohibited from traveling outside the Western Hemisphere or to
Cuba. 94
In Aptheker v. Secretary of State9 5 the passports of two leading
Party officials96 were withdrawn pursuant to section 6. The Supreme
Court held section 6 incompatible with the constitutional right to
travel 97 on the ground that the restrictions were based upon "a
tenuous relationship between the bare fact of organizational mem88 However, this is merely a possible inference. See note 78 supra.

81 Pursuant to Subversive Activities Control Act § 7 (d) (2), 64 Stat. 994 (1950), 50
U.S.C. § 786(d) (2) (1958).
90 64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U..C. § 785 (1958).
91 S. REP. No. 269, pt. 1, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950). See Subversive Activities
Control Act § 2 (8), 64 Stat. 988 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (8) (1958).
," See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
"8See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 502 (1964).
o' Id. at 511-12.
93 78 U.S. 500 (1964).
90Aptheker was the editor of Political Affairs, the Party's "theoretical organ" in
the United States. Flynn was the Party chairman. Both were native-born dtizens of
the United States, and both had held valid passports prior to State Department revocation under § 6 of the McCarran Act. See id. at 502, 515.
9, The right to travel free of unreasonable restrictions is protected by the fifth
amendment. 378 U.S. at 505-07. Accord, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958).
The composition of the majority and dissenting factions in Aptheher is of some
analytical interest. The majority consisted of the four dissenters in Scales-Justices
Warren, Black, Douglas and Brennan-with the addition of the newest Court member,
Mr. Justice Goldberg, who wrote the majority opinion. Due to the apparent stability
of the Warren-Black-Douglas-Brennan bloc in the Communist control cases, the
addition of Mr. Justice Goldberg to this group in Aptheker may indicate that this
bloc will now form a consistent majority. Compare Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S.
109 (1963); Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469 (1963).
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bership and the activity Congress sought to proscribe."98 The Court
refused to consider whether this passport restriction would be constitutional if applied only to top-ranking Party leaders such as tne
defendants, since the statute was not susceptible of such a construction. 99
Since the opportunity of Party leaders to confer with Communists abroad may be sufficiently related to the threat of violent overthrow of the Government, it is possible that a statute explicitly
limited in application to Party officials could constitutionally limit
the right to travel. 00 In such event, the Government also might be
required to prove further that the applicant for passport intends
to participate in such a conspiracy.
Alternatively, the purpose of section 6 might be effectuated
through use of section 1 of the Passport Act of 1926101 and section
215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.102 These provisions empower the Secretary of State to issue passports and, unless
the citizen has a valid passport, to prohibit travel from the United
States (except to such countries as the President may authorize)
during a state of national emergency proclaimed by the President.
A state of national emergency proclaimed during the Korean conflict' 0 3 has never been rescinded or terminated. 10 4 Hence, the State
Department still has power to place geographical limitations on
travel by refusing to validate passports to certain foreign countries.
The constitutionality of such a procedure was recently upheld in
Zemel v. Rusk, 105 where the plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement
of the above two acts in order to validate his passport for tourist
98 378 U.S.

at 514.
9Id. at 515-16. Section 6 makes it unlawful for any member of a Communist
organization which has been ordered to register to apply for or receive a passport.
The clarity and precision of this provision, as contrasted with the membership clause
of the Smith Act, made it impossible for the Court to incorporate the elements of
activeness and specific intent. Ibid.
100A narrowly drawn restriction on travel premised on congressional power to

safeguard the United States would probably be constitutional. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, ci. 11. See also 378 U.S. at 509. It would also seem that Congress could delegate
the power to impose such restrictions to the State Department. See Zemel v. Rusk, 85
S. Ct. 1271, 1276-79 (1965).
1*144 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1958).
10266 Stat. 190 (1952). 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1958).
10'Proc. No. 2914, 64 Stat. A454 (1950).
104 Zemel v. Rusk, 85 S. Ct. 1271, 1277 (1965).
105 85 S. Ct. 1271 (1965).
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travel to Cuba.
The Supreme Court held that since the issuance of
passports could directly affect foreign relations, governmental imposition of geographical travel restrictions did not contravene the
right to travel guaranteed by the fifth amendment. 0 7 Under this
rationale, Congress could prohibit travel by American citizens to
specific Communist countries, or to specified countries within which
a Communist Party is active if such activity reasonably presages an
attempt at violent overthrow.
LABOR UNIONS

The vital role which labor unions play in the economic structure
of the United States renders Communist infiltration of unions a
special threat to national security. In 1941 the Party promoted a
lengthy political strike at an Allis-Chambers defense plant after
having placed one of its members in a commanding position in the
union. 08 With such incidents in mind, Congress enacted section
9 (h) of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947109 to prohibit labor unions
from access to the facilities of the NLRB or a place on the ballot in
representation proceedings unless all of their officers annually signed
a non-Communist affidavit." 0
The constitutionality of this provision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in American CommunicationsAss'n v. Douds."' The
Court characterized the affidavit requirements as an indirect restraint
on freedom of assembly," 2 since members who refused to sign were
nevertheless allowed to hold union office."" In place of the "clear
and present danger" test, 114 the Court chose a balancing approach,
108

1 1d. at 1274. The request for validation was made on March 31, 1962, and the
Passport Office informed him that tourist travel to Cuba was not in the best interest
of the United States, and had been excluded by the State Department. Zemel v. Rusk,
228 F. Supp. 65, 66 (D. Conn. 1964).
10785 S. Ct. at 1279-82.
108 See Hearings on Bills to Amend and Repeal the National Labor Relations Act
Before the House Committee on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 3609-15
(1947); American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 388 (1950).
209 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9 (h), 61 Stat. 146 (1947).
110The affidavits required each officer to certify that he was not a member of the
Communist Party nor supported any organization which advocated forcible overthrow
of the government. See statute cited note 109 supra.
11 39 U.S. 382 (1950).
222 Id. at 399-400; see 341 U.S. at 507.
18 339 U.S. at 389-90. Although § 9 (h) sanctioned substantially more than mere
withdrawal of NLRB facilities, the Court found that unions could exist and perform
meaningful functions without complying with the section. Ibid.
"I Id. at 893-400.
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weighing the evil of Communist leadership in labor unions" against

the inhibiting effect on freedom of speech and association resulting
from coercing unions to deny Communists executive positions. 1 6
The requirement of non-Communist affidavits worked poorly in

practice,"

7

however, and in 1959 Congress repealed section 9 (h).

To achieve the same objectives, 1

8

it substituted the approach con-

tained in section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. 1 9 This section imposes criminal sanctions directly
upon any labor union executive who is a Communist Party member,
whether or not he believes in the forcible overthrow of the Government or intends to cause a political strike. 20 However, the prohibition contained in section 504 presents a different case from Douds,
in that it does expressly prohibit union officers from being Party
members.'

21

The constitutionality of section 504 has been challenged in
Brown v. United States, 22 currently pending before the Supreme
Court. Brown was a Communist Party member elected to the
executive board of a local longshoreman's union.123 His conviction
was reversed by the Ninth Circuit on the ground that section 504
was unconstitutional. The court held that Douds was distinguishable, 24 and that fifth amendment standards of criminal imputability
from association would be met only if section 504 were construed to
its Id. at 399-400.
l10 Id. at 400-12.

Besides complicating and delaying the processing of cases before the NLRB, the
non-Communist affidavits actually failed to accomplish their express purpose, for the
Party simply instructed those who were affected by the statute to file the affidavits
anyway and continue their Party membership on a secret basis. See Hearings on Bills
Pertaining to Labor-Management Reform Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1959) (Mr.
J. Walter Yeagley). Furthermore, the affidavits made it possible for the leadership of
a Communist-dominated union to appear to have received a clean bill of health from
the government, thereby hindering the efforts of anti-Communist unions to displace
the Communist union. See id. at 597 (Goldberg, J., then counsel to UAW).
' Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S.
899 (1964) (No. 399, 1964 Term).
119 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. V, 1964).
120 A violation of § 504 renders the violator liable for a maximum fine of $10,000,
a maximum imprisonment of ten years, or both. § 504 (b), 73 Stat. 537 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 504 (b) (Supp. V, 1964).
217

121

Compare 339 U.S. at 409.

122 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 1..S. 899 (1964)

Term).
123 Id. at 491.
12, Id. at 494.

(No. 399, 1964
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require the element of specific intent to use union office for purposes
of interrupting interstate commerce or overthrowing the Government. 125 In the court's opinion, section 504 was not susceptible to
such a construction and, therefore, did not afford a Party member a
basis for determining whether his political convictions disqualified
126
him from holding union office.
Perhaps section 504 need not be construed to require proof of
specific intent. It can be argued that the disposition of a particular
class of persons to commit acts injurious to the public welfare should
constitute a constitutionally sufficient basis for proscribing any or
all of its members from holding positions of public importance; a
great deal of prohibitory legislation enacted under congressional
1 27
power to regulate interstate commerce is grounded on this premise.
Brown indicates,however, that legislation presuming a disposition to
commit injurious acts merely from the fact of membership in an
organization fails to satisfy constitutional standards of reasonable
classification. Presumably this objection might be cured by limiting
section 504's proscription to active members of the Party.
CONCLUSION

The legislative effort to devise statutory controls inhibiting the
activity of Communists within the United States has been generally
unsuccessful. Convictions under the conspiracy and advocacy clauses
of the Smith Act will be impossible in the absence of action tending
to result in a probability of harm.128 Convictions under that act's
12
membership clause in turn require evidence of illegal advocacy.
The spectre of possible Smith Act prosecutions, on the other hand,
has thwarted attempts to compel disclosure of Communist member15

2 Id. at 496.

I,6

Id.
at 496-97.

34 F.2d at 505 (Chambers, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Banking Act of 1933, § 21,
48 Stat. 189, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1958) (prohibiting a person from engaging
in the business of underwriting or selling securities while also engaged in the business
12

of receiving deposits subject to repayment by check or presentation of a passbook);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 4 (a), 48 Stat. 885, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (a)
(1958) (prohibiting SEC Commissioners from engaging in any other business, or
dealing in any stock-market operations of a character subject to SEC regulation); 18
U.S.C. § 283 (1958) (prohibiting officers or employees of the United States from acting
or attorneys for prosecuting claims against the United States).
as agents
8
12
See text accompanying notes 28-25 supra.
1
See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
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ship and activities pursuant to the McCarran Act. 130 The attempt to
eliminate Communists from labor unions has also been frustrated by
131
the problem of imposing criminal sanctions.
According to one student of the Communist movement, those
Communist agents who represent a truly dangerous threat to na132
tional security sever all ties with overt Communist organizations;
this author concludes that outlawing the Party serves only to hinder
effective counterespionage. 33 Thus, until such time as the internal
Communist Party does present a demonstrable threat to national
security, it would appear wise to effectuate the McCarran Act's
policy of disclosure by suspending prosecutions under the Smith
Act. Restrictions on travel and membership in unions could be
narrowly drawn without imposing criminal sanctions. This would
preclude the possibility of self-incrimination problems and insure
a degree of protection commensurate with the desire to eliminate
Communist activity in vital areas.
'8o Repealing or vitiating the Smith Act has apparently become a political hot
potato tossed among all three branches of the federal government. Instead of repealing
the Smith Act, Congress enacted the less specific immunity clause of the McCarran Act.
See note 60 supra and accompanying text. The Court limited the protection accorded
by this section to "mere members," see text accompanying notes 60-61 supra, and hence
created a problem involving self-incrimination. See text accompanying notes 66-67 & 89
supra. Although the Justice Department has the power to grant immunity from the
possibility of Smith Act prosecutions, see note 70 supra and accompanying text, it has
been hesitant to invoke this power.
181 See text accompanying notes 122-26 supra.
182EBENSTEIN, TODAY'S IsMs 26 (1961).
133Ibid. Compare hearings cited note 52 supra. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover opposes
outlawing the Communist Party of the United States on similar grounds. Hearings on
H.R. 1884 and H.R. 2122 Before the House Committee on Un-American Activities,
80th Cong., Ist Sess. 43 (1947).

